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Abstract 
 The development and growth of the secondary ticket market over the last few decades 
was discussed, in order to see how it has become what it is today.  The goal of the research is to 
see how people living in New York perceive ticket scalping and whether or not they respect the 
law.  The expanding use and popularity of secondary websites such as StubHub are discussed, 
and how most transactions take place over the internet.  Additionally, the current trends in the 
ticketing industry are mentioned and how organizations have attempted to curb scalping over the 
last few years.  As a result, the basic recommendation is that the secondary market should either 
be free, or there should be a uniform federal law to place each state under the same restrictions.   
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Introduction 
Ticket Scalping, in its broadest definition, is the process of reselling tickets above their 
face value. The practice began around the end of the 19thcentury, when people sold their railroad 
tickets (Simon, 2004). Scalpers would purchase large quantities of tickets and then attempt to sell 
them at a premium (Benitah, 2005). Today, the process has evolved within the sport and 
entertainment industry, where scalpers and brokers buy and sell tickets for massive profits. The 
more popular the event, the more people are willing to pay to see it, and it isn’t uncommon for 
fans to pay double or even triple the printed price of the ticket (Simon, 2004). As a result, states 
have passed legislation to eliminate, or at the minimal limit the secondary ticket market. While 
one may think these laws are aimed at the stereotypical scalper on the street corner of the 
ballpark, they extend to brokers and licensees, who also make up a large part of the secondary 
market.  
My research question is: how do people living in New York State perceive the ticket 
scalping law? The goal of this paper is to examine the marketing, economic and legal aspects 
associated with ticket scalping and the secondary market. Benitah (2005) mentioned how 
governments have tried to regulate ticket scalping since the early 1900s. Yet, even though it is 
considered illegal in many states, it still takes place. The goal of this research is to determine 
why reselling tickets above face value is still a problem and how people living in New York 
State view the law.  In addition, are scalpers on secondary sites perceived the same way as those 
on the street corner? These questions are significant because of all the parties involved in the 
primary and secondary ticket market. First, there are the producers or businesses that host the 
event and issue the primary number of tickets. The secondary market is comprised of brokers, 
secondary websites and consumers. Brokers such as Ticketmaster are licensed by the state and 
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are allowed to purchase large quantities of tickets and charge a transaction fee in order to recoup 
their money and earn a small profit. Secondary websites such as StubHub generally pay 
professional teams and entertainment promoters a fee to resell their tickets (Drayer, 2011b).  
This research will contribute to both the academic and legal community, because it will 
expose why ticket scalping exists and what can be done to control it. Local governments will be 
able to see where the law has failed, which may prompt them to allocate more resources to 
enforce it or introduce new statutes. This recommendation will be given after my research. 
Literature Review 
Ticket Scalping and Basic Economics 
Ticket scalping can be understood through the economic perspective of supply and 
demand.  Busch and Curry (2011) note how ticket prices are reflective of the demand for an 
event.  The demand is directly related to the teams that are playing, their record, and other 
external factors such as the weather (Harrington, 2009; Rishe, & Mondello, 2004).  Since 
attendance is important for selling sponsorships and television rights, professional teams often 
underprice their tickets in order to fill the seats (Drayer, Rascher, & McEvoy, 2012).  In addition, 
they often sell their tickets below market value because of existing competition in the 
surrounding area, such as other professional franchises (Drayer & Shapiro, 2009).  Despite this 
practice, the average ticket price has seen significant increases over the last few years (Howard 
& Burton, 2002).  Teams also adopt a straight, fixed method for setting their prices, where they 
remain the same throughout the season, despite changes in demand (Kobritz & Palmer, 2011).  
As a result, scalping exists when fans recognize the demand for tickets exceeding the supply, 
choosing to sell them above the face value (Busch & Curry, 2011).  Moore (2010) found, as long 
as teams fail to equate the face value with market value, the secondary ticket market will 
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continue to exist.   This model seems to have worked well, since those who value attendance at 
an event the most are generally able to acquire tickets (Simon, 2004). 
The Scalping Process 
Before examining the developments in the secondary market, it is important to 
understand the role of scalpers.  Atkinson (2000) studied a group of scalpers in Canada, 
examining their behaviors and interactions with consumers. Over the course of a year, he 
observed 54 scalpers ranging in age from 14 to 42 years old and anywhere from 6 months to 24 
years of experience buying and selling tickets (Atkinson, 2000).  From his observations and 
interviews with scalpers, he was able to establish a few different types of interactions with 
consumers. 
Atkinson (2000) identifies the first type of transaction as the “Fast Hustle” which 
involves a sale between a scalper and consumer.  The conditions for the sale generally favor the 
scalpers because there is a high volume of foot traffic and consumers have a high willingness to 
pay for tickets (Atkinson, 2000).  Therefore, scalpers look to capitalize on selling the most 
tickets in the shortest amount of time (Atkinson, 2000).  One of the major misconceptions is that 
each scalper is in business for him/herself.  In reality, they generally work in small groups, 
meeting before the event to determine the most realistic price for the event.  This ensures that 
everyone is on the same page, making it difficult for consumers to negotiate (Atkinson, 2000).  
The second transaction Atkinson identified was the “Go-Nowhere Hustle”.  According to 
his observations, this type of interaction happens in one out of three exchanges and never ends in 
a sale (Atkinson, 2000).  Scalpers generally are unable to unload their tickets because of 
irreconcilable differences between the two parties.  The consumer may perceive the quality of 
the tickets as relatively low or the scalper does not have the seats they are looking for (Atkinson, 
TICKET SCALPING IN NEW YORK STATE 6 
2000).  Carmon and Ariely (2000) noted that this is attributed to loss aversion, where a buyer or 
seller avoids making a deal based on what they stand to forgo. 
The third type of scalping transaction is the “Rough Hustle” which usually begins as a 
“Go-Nowhere Hustle” where buyers and sellers are not seeing eye-to-eye (Atkinson, 2000).  The 
external factors that affect this transaction include low demand and large supplies of tickets 
available from the primary source (Atkinson, 2000).  As a result, scalpers earn small profits and 
are forced to negotiate with buyers (Atkinson, 2000).  To break down the barriers between the 
parties, scalpers often carry maps with them to show consumers where their seats will be.  This 
generally builds a sense of trust and leads to a sale (Atkinson, 2000). 
Drayer (2011a) found in his research that street scalpers are the ones who are impacted 
the most by scalping legislation.  Interestingly enough, they understand the risk and reward of 
the behavior, and set out to sell tickets well above the legal range, intentionally breaking the law 
(Drayer, 2011a).  Another common strategy scalpers employ, is carrying seating charts and 
holding signs that state, “I need tickets,” placing them on the purchasing side of the law (Drayer, 
2011a).  Atkinson (2000) observed in his research that scalpers will occupy either the parking 
lots or bus and subway stops where fans that have not purchased their tickets are likely to be. 
Scalpers are generally able to get away with selling their tickets this way, because law 
enforcement and security personnel only patrol on the stadium grounds (Drayer, 2011a).   
While scalping has generally been associated with sold-out events, some fans still utilize 
them when the demand is relatively low.  Busch and Curry (2011) created a model to show the 
different scenarios where scalping may exist.  From their research, they were able to conclude 
that some consumers possess the willingness to pay for face value tickets, but do not want to wait 
in line (Busch & Curry, 2011).  As a result, they look to scalpers, who generally have a selection 
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of premium seats with virtually no wait, choosing to pay extra for a convenience (Busch & 
Curry, 2011).   
Benefits of Scalpers 
In some cases, scalpers can provide an economic benefit for the producer.  When scalpers 
purchase tickets with the intent of selling them for a profit, they are assuming a risk (Courty, P, 
2003; Spindler, 2003).  This means that they are able to sell them for anywhere between 50 to 
1000 percent above face value, depending on the demand of the event (Atkinson, 2000). Other 
times, they are forced to settle for well below the face value in order to recoup their initial 
investment (Karp & Perloff, 2005; Spindler, 2003; Swofford, 2003).  Depken (2007) found that 
in markets where scalping was legalized, teams generally charged lower prices.  This is because 
they were selling their tickets to both true fans and scalpers, rather than one select group 
(Depken, 2007). Karp and Perloff (2005) argue that tickets for an event are a perishable good, 
meaning they are selling an intangible experience.  When scalpers sell tickets for below face 
value, it offers the opportunity for someone to attend the event that otherwise would not have 
due to price discrimination (Karp & Perloff, 2005).  Therefore, the team benefits from having a 
ticket sold and a seat filled, and the consumer benefits from receiving a discounted ticket (Karp 
& Perloff, 2005).  
Growth of Secondary Market 
One of the changes the sport and entertainment industry has seen over the last few 
decades is the different components of the secondary market.  Aside from the typical scalper on 
the street corner, the secondary market has generally been associated with authorized brokers 
such as Ticketmaster, who set up agreements with the venue to sell tickets for any event that 
takes place there, charging a small fee for each transaction (Glantz, 2005).  While these brokers 
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sometimes sell tickets above face value, they are considered legitimate, because they are licensed 
through the government and subject to regulations and inspections like other businesses (Kobritz 
& Palmer, 2011).  The growth of Ticketmaster has led to its expansion, where it sold 
approximately 119 million tickets and generated $6 billion in global revenue (Kirkman, 2009). 
 While the popular trend used to be purchasing tickets in person and on the phone, the 
majority of transactions take place on the internet.  In fact, it is estimated that secondary websites 
such as StubHub, eBay, RazorGator, and TicketsNow are valued at $5 billion and grow 12 
percent annually (Schroeder, Fisher, Orbe, & Bush, 2012).  This exponential growth can be 
explained through the convenience of the sites, which allow a consumer to purchase tickets with 
the click of a mouse (Howard & Crompton, 2004).  Another reason why customers seem to 
prefer this method to ordering tickets is that it allows them to compare prices as opposed to 
trusting that a scalper is giving them a “good deal” (Harrington, 2009).   
Some professional franchises have always been vehemently opposed to the resale of their 
tickets.  Nagel (2011) discussed how professional sport franchises view tickets as a revocable 
license, which can be withdrawn from an owner at any given time.  One example of this was 
when the Yankees instituted a policy in 2006 of canceling season tickets for anyone caught 
reselling them (Moore, 2010).  However, New York passed legislation in 2007, which prevented 
venues from canceling season tickets, saying that it was up to the owner to determine resale price 
and method (Moore, 2010).  Another example that led to court action was when the New 
England Patriots filed suit against StubHub, demanding names of people who sold tickets to see 
if they were season ticket holders (Moore, 2010).  Although the purpose of the Patriots acquiring 
the names was to cancel season ticket holders who sold their tickets on the secondary market, 
they did not take any action (Moore, 2010).   
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Professional Teams and the Secondary Market 
 For many years, the secondary market was comprised solely of third party resellers, 
connecting the buyers and sellers.  However, within the last few years, many professional 
franchises have developed their own secondary ticket services in order to control the exchanges 
and capitalize on the money, specifically with online services (Geng, Wu, & Whinston, 2007).  
One of the biggest threats to the resale industry is when fraudulent tickets get circulated in the 
marketplace and fans attempt to enter a venue with counterfeits (Drayer, Stotlar, & Irwin, 2008).  
This is done when scalpers make multiple copies of a ticket they printed at home and attempt to 
sell them to fans (Drayer, Stotlar, & Irwin, 2008).  These types of incidents ultimately lead to a 
negative perception of the franchise by the consumer and cognitive dissonance of their purchase 
(Drayer, Stotlar, & Irwin, 2008).  For example, if someone bought a counterfeit ticket and was 
turned away at the gate, he/she will complain to the team, even though they did not receive any 
of the money from the transaction (Drayer, Stotlar, & Irwin, 2008).  Drayer (2011b) also 
mentioned how the harassment of fans by scalpers can lead to a poor fan experience.  Not to 
mention, if a customer goes to an event, planning to spend 50 dollars on tickets, and a scalper is 
trying to unload them for 25 dollars, the team misses out on potential revenue.  For these reasons, 
many teams have begun to adopt in-house ticket exchanges for their fans.  Simon (2004) noted 
that this service allows fans that cannot attend games to recoup their initial investment, sell their 
tickets in a safe environment, and earn a percentage of each transaction.  In addition, since the 
scalping laws vary by each city and state, teams are free to establish their own ticket policies for 
the resale market (Drayer, 2011a). 
 The San Francisco Giants were the first professional team to experiment with a secondary 
ticket system back in the early 2000s (Howard & Crompton, 2004).  The process involved season 
TICKET SCALPING IN NEW YORK STATE 10 
ticket holders posting their tickets for sale through the team (Howard & Crompton, 2004).  Other 
fans then had the ability to pick up their tickets at the will-call window or automated will-call 
machines throughout the ballpark (Howard & Crompton, 2004).  The system showed immediate 
success, with no-show rates dropping 50 percent and the Giants earning a half million dollars in 
revenue from the 10 percent convenience fee on the transaction (Howard & Crompton, 2004).  
Another benefit is the availability of high demand, lower bowl seats that otherwise would have 
been restricted from the general public (Harrington, 2010).  The Giants were able to sell 110,000 
tickets using the season ticket holder exchange, and found that 44% of people would not have 
attended the game if the seats they purchased were not available (Drayer, Stotlar, & Irwin, 2008). 
 The Seattle Mariners followed suit and created a similar system for their season ticket 
holders in 2003 (Benitah, 2005).  While the state of Washington did not have any resale 
regulations, the city of Seattle prohibited people from selling them above face value (Benitah, 
2005).  The Mariners decided to outsource the service to LiquidSeats (now StubHub), where fans 
were able to sell their tickets at, above, or below face value (Benitah, 2005).  At first glance, one 
would perceive the system to be dysfunctional because the Mariners had no control over prices.  
However, they would rather see their tickets sell for the highest price the market could bear, 
since they charged the buyer 15 percent of the final price and 10 percent from the seller (Benitah, 
2005).  
The Future of Ticketing 
 In an attempt to regulate the secondary market and grow ticketing databases, many teams 
have begun adopting paperless ticket technology (Moore, 2010).  This allows fans to enter an 
event with their driver’s license or credit card (Moore, 2010).  From the perspective of the 
franchise, it addresses a lot of the problems where the law falls short.  Moore (2010) noted how 
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effective the technology is in eliminating fraudulent tickets and regulating ticket prices.  Teams 
can also track who is selling the tickets, who is buying them, and how much they’re paying 
(Moore, 2010).  As Harrington and Harrington (2012) found, converting the highest demand 
seats to paperless tickets helps to eliminate the temptation to sell them above face value.  Reese 
and Snyder (2005) noted that teams who take an aggressive stance on scalping will create a more 
positive purchasing experience, encouraging fans to continually support them. 
While the technology makes the process of buying and selling tickets efficient, it 
eliminates the physical stubs, which many fans collect or use to get autographs (Moore, 2010).  
Another counter argument is that tickets are already considered perishable goods and eliminating 
the tangible ticket makes them more perishable (Harrington & Harrington, 2012).  For fans 
looking to get rid of a ticket at the last minute, paperless tickets prove to be an inconvenience.   
 Looking forward, one major obstacle for ticketing is finding an option where both sides 
can coexist.  Harrington and Harrington (2012) observed a Bruce Springsteen concert that 
utilized paperless ticketing reduced the inventory of high demand seats on StubHub by 63 
percent.  As a result, they have encouraged states to create laws limiting the use of paperless 
tickets, but have not made much progress (Harrington & Harrington, 2012).  One possible 
remedy is the option to transfer the electronic version over to paper copy at the venue 
(Harrington & Harrington, 2012).   
Professional Teams Scalping Their Own Tickets 
While the ticket-exchange system has proven to be effective for some teams and their 
fans, there have been instances when organizations have scalped their own tickets. In 2003, Peter 
Cavoto and Gerald A. Carr filed a suit against the Chicago Cubs and Wrigley Field Premium 
Ticket Services Inc (who share the same owner), for violating Illinois’ Ticket Scalping Act, 
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Consumer Fraud Act, and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Cavoto v. Chicago National League 
Ball Club, Inc, 2006).  The plaintiffs purchased tickets through Wrigley Field Premium Ticket 
Services Inc. after learning an upcoming game was sold out.  They claimed that they purchased 
tickets for between $50 and $130 on two separate occasions, even though the face value was $36 
(Cavoto v. Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc, 2006).  The court found that the Chicago 
Cubs and Wrigley Field Ticket Services Inc. did not violate the Ticket Scalping Act.  In Illinois, 
the sale of tickets above their face value is completely prohibited, except for brokers, who are 
allowed to if they are registered by the state (Cavoto v. Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc, 
2006).  Since the broker was registered with the state of Illinois, they were permitted to sell 
tickets at whatever price they wanted to.  The court also stated that the purchase of the tickets 
was completely optional, and the plaintiffs were not forced to buy them (Cavoto v. Chicago 
National League Ball Club, Inc, 2006).  Finally, they did not violate the Deceptive Trade 
Practice Act, because the transfer of the tickets was done through a sale (Cavoto v. Chicago 
National League Ball Club, Inc, 2006).   
 By creating a ticket broker, the Cubs were able to find a loophole in the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement, increasing their profits immensely.  Major League Baseball has a 
regulation that requires teams to give thirty percent of their ticket revenue to the league, which is 
then distributed equally among the teams (Simon, 2004).  This means that since the Cubs sold 
tickets through their broker, they could charge above face value to increase their profits, which 
they did not have to give back to the league.  Simon (2004) stated that the Cubs could take a $45 
ticket, charge $1500 for a premium game, and then avoid paying the $500 that they would be 
forced to under the league rules.  In 2003, the system worked well for the Cubs, because they 
were able to transfer high demand tickets generally set aside for VIPs, media sponsors, and 
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elected officials to their broker (Siporin, 2004).  This is compared to 2002, where they lost close 
to $16,000 due to unsold tickets (Siporin, 2004). 
Ticket Scalping Legislation 
Since professional sport franchises under price their tickets it is not uncommon for an 
event to sellout after only a few hours (Moore, 2010).  As mentioned in the introduction, scalpers 
adopt the policy of buying large quantities of tickets in order to maximize their profits (Benitah, 
2005). To control this problem, states have passed legislation, which places limits on resale 
transactions. For example, New York’s ticket scalping statute falls under article 25 of the Arts 
and Cultural Affairs Law [ACAL], which covers multiple aspects of resale, such as pricing, 
buffer zones (resale distances from venues), and penalties for violating the law (Simon, 2004).   
One of the most cited cases concerning scalping law in New York State are People v. 
Concert Connection Ltd. (1995).  The case involved the defendants appealing a ruling that they 
had violated the article 25 of the ACAL, when they sold tickets for above their face value 
(People v Concert Connection Ltd., 1995).  They also appealed because the business was located 
in Connecticut, and claimed that the courts should have no interest in the case (People v. Concert 
Connection Ltd., 1995).  However, the court ruled that the business advertised in New York 
newspapers, maintained New York phone numbers, and shipped tickets to residents in New York 
State, allowing them to intervene (People v. Concert Connection Ltd., 1995).  The law also 
protects consumers from paying exorbitant prices, and therefore the company was subject to 
charges.  The defendants ended up losing the appeal, and were forced to pay $2000 in court fees 
and restitution to customers that overpaid for tickets (People v. Concert Connection Ltd., 1995).   
This case represents the extent to which New York State was willing to get involved in order to 
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protect not only the consumers from paying an inflated price, but also the teams and promoters 
who work to keep prices below market value for their consumers. 
 Another case that that challenged the law was People v. Lewis (2008), where the 
defendant was charged with violating the ticket scalping statute, due to his proximity to the 
venue.  The defendant was seen by a police officer standing 200 feet from Madison Square 
Garden asking people if they wanted to purchase tickets to a concert taking place that night 
(People v. Lewis, 2008).  This violated article 25 of the Arts and Cultural Affairs Law, which 
prohibits sellers from being within 1500 feet of a venue which seats 5000 or more people 
(People v. Lewis, 2008).  In addition, the tickets that Lewis was scalping were counterfeit, 
leading to felony charges, and a 2-4 year prison sentence (People v. Lewis, 2008).  By requiring 
people to stand at least 1500 feet away from the venue, unnecessary traffic is eliminated and 
those who have not purchased tickets are more likely to buy them from the ticket office as 
opposed to a scalper.  
 Although legislation against ticket scalping exists, there are some hurdles that make 
enforcing it difficult.  Drayer (2011a) found that if scalpers are arrested, it is generally for 
something else.  In 2009, scalpers were arrested outside of stadium not for selling their tickets, 
but disrupting the flow of automobile and pedestrian traffic (Drayer, 2011a).  Another major 
challenge is that each state operates under a different set of laws (if they even exist).  For 
example, Massachusetts only allows tickets to be sold for 2 dollars above face value, whereas 
Colorado is lenient and does not have any laws against the practice (Drayer, 2011a).   
 New York State is a unique case because of how the law has evolved over the last few 
decades.  Prior to 1984, New York had a very strict stance on ticket scalping, where the resale 
value could not exceed more than 2 dollars (Drayer, 2011a).  In 1984, they reformed their policy, 
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extending the resale value to 5 dollars or 10 percent, whichever was greater (Drayer, 2011a).  
Then, in 2001 the law was loosened further to 20 percent above face value (Drayer, 2011a).  
Shortly thereafter, the law was once again amended to 45 percent above face value (Happel & 
Jennings, 2002).  These constant changes make it difficult for law enforcement to adapt and 
ultimately prosecute anyone guilty of scalping. 
 With respect to secondary websites such as StubHub, authorities have an equally difficult 
time enforcing the law.  The first major challenge is that the sellers are difficult to identify, since 
they are only required to post the section and row of the seats (Drayer, 2011a).  Teams looking to 
identify season ticket holders breaking the law do not have enough information to take action 
and would not risk falsely accusing fans (Drayer, 2011a).  Secondly, authorities only have the 
jurisdiction to prosecute when the buyers and sellers are located in the same state (Drayer, 
2011a).  They also receive little assistance from the secondary websites, who advise fans not to 
sell their tickets above face value, but have little incentive to strictly enforce it since they earn a 
commission on each sale (Drayer, 2011a).  
Proposed Federal Legislation 
One generally agreed upon idea, is that as long as there are high demand events, there 
will be ticket scalping.  While the practice cannot be completely eliminated, federal legislation 
would have a dramatic impact, creating a uniform regulation that teams, brokers, and individuals 
must abide by.  The first time federal legislation against ticket scalping was mentioned, came 
back in 1998, when United States Representative Gary Ackerman, a Democrat from New York 
proposed a uniform law (Glantz, 2005).  If passed, the Federal Uniform Ticket Resale Act 
[FUTRA] would eliminate scalpers altogether, only allowing licensed brokers to remain in the 
market (Glantz, 2005).  Additionally, anyone who was caught selling tickets at exorbitant prices 
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faced stiff criminal penalties (Glantz, 2005).   While the legislation had the goal of suppressing 
scalpers and brokers and helping the consumer, it did not receive the support to put it into effect 
(Glantz, 2005).  Glantz (2005) attributed this to the fact that brokers and other secondary 
resellers, who were legally registered, purchased licenses and paid taxes on transactions, 
providing revenue for the state.   
The second piece of federal legislation to be introduced came during the late 2000s.  The 
Better Oversight of Secondary Sales and Accountability in Concert Ticketing (BOSS) Act, 
would create an environment that would allow consumers a better opportunity to acquire tickets, 
breaking down the leverage brokers have (Klein, 2010).  The bill would prevent brokers from 
purchasing tickets for 48 hours after they go on sale, requiring them to list the quantity of tickets 
they have for sale, and displaying the final face value, preventing fraudulent sales (Klein, 2010). 
A federal law seems good on paper, but the chance of anything happening in the 
foreseeable future is slim.  This is partly due to the different agendas each side has when it 
comes to ticket resale.  Drayer (2011a) explained that teams would support state and federal 
legislation in order to have greater control over prices and maximize their revenue.  Consumers 
would also support a federal law, since it limits resale prices and would allow them to access 
tickets before brokers (Drayer, 2011a).  Brokers on the other hand, are against any sort of 
regulation and would rather see the market determine the prices (Drayer, 2011a).  Their belief is 
that a lack of regulation will result in more trades between consumers, driving the ticket prices 




The research tradition my topic focused on is post-positivism.  Gratton and Jones (2010) 
noted that post-positivism makes it difficult to understand a topic through measurement and 
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observation, and there are limitations that must be addressed.  In the case of my topic, an event 
has thousands of people attending, making it difficult to randomly select participants.  This 
means it won’t be possible for me to collect data at the event itself, but after the fact.  Another 
limitation when using a survey as opposed to an observation is that participants may misinterpret 
the question or give false answers.  This may affect my final results and recommendations. 
The second component of post-positivist research is that theories can only be disproved 
(Gratton & Jones, 2010).  As it relates to my research, I looked at the sport deviance theory and 
how it related to fans’ purchasing behavior.  Specifically, whether or not the fans intentionally 
broke the law because they knew they would not be caught or if there is some other motivation.   
Post-positivism research also consists of knowledge that is relative, not absolute (Gratton 
& Jones, 2010).  Since I collected data from a small section of people in New York State, it is 
impossible to generalize the findings on the larger population.  Additionally, the laws and 
ticketing policies are constantly changing, meaning this project is a foundation for further 
research, as opposed to a benchmark.   
In order to answer my research question, used the data collected to establish 
relationships.  Post-positivist research consists of both quantitative and qualitative data (Gratton 
& Jones, 2010).  For my project, I used quantitative data such as income levels and qualitative 
data of where consumers generally purchase their tickets to see what conclusions I can draw.  By 
doing so, I can address my questions, establish relationships between variables and give 
recommendations for additional research.  
Conceptual Framework 
 For this research, tickets will be defined as the tangible stub or the electronic version of 
admittance into an event.  Events will be defined as sporting or entertainment experiences that 
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include but are not limited to sport competitions, concerts, movies, or theatrical productions.   
Ticket scalping will be defined as buying or selling ticket above the value printed on the stub.  
This includes tickets purchased physically, either from a person or business, and electronically, 
through a website or by phone.  The primary market will be defined as tickets sold by the 
producer of an event, such as a professional team, or concert venue.  The secondary market will 
be anyone selling tickets that are not the primary market.  This includes scalpers, websites such 
StubHub, or brokers such Ticketmaster.  Lastly, ticket-scalping law will refer to Article 25 of the 
Arts and Cultural Affairs, which prohibits the sale of tickets within 1500 of a venue that sits 
5000 or more people.  It also refers to authorized brokers who have obtained a license through 
the State of New York.   
 While the set-up is solid, there is still the possibility of intervening variables in the data.  
One example is the income levels of survey participants, which may affect the participants’ 
willingness to partake in ticket scalping.  Another intervening variable is age; the law has 
constantly evolved, making it difficult for consumers to keep up.  What was considered 
permissible 10 years ago is now illegal.   
Theoretical Framework 
The theory most closely related to my research is the sport deviance theory.  In sports, 
there are sets of rules that sometimes athletes violate (Atkinson, 2000).  Additionally, while 
outside of the sport context, violation of these rules is punishable, inside they are accepted as part 
of the game (Atkinson, 2000). Although sport deviance theory was originally developed for sport 
participants, it can be applied to spectators because of the way fans identify themselves with a 
particular team.  Atkinson (2000) contends the deviance theory can also be applied to spectators 
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because their actions are reflective of the performance on the field.  Die-hard fans often bask in 
the reflecting glory of their team when they win and cast-off the reflected failure when they lose. 
This research attempts to answer why some people intentionally ignore the laws and 
purchase scalped tickets.  Although there are laws and consequences for breaking them, people 
are rarely punished, allowing the behavior to become accepted.  While buyers purchasing 
scalped tickets are not physically hurt, they may be harassed or taken advantage of by sellers, in 
the form of fraudulent tickets.  Overall, scalpers use the possession of desirable tickets as 
leverage to earn profits from others. 
Design 
 The survey design I implemented for my research is cross-sectional.  Cross-sectional 
surveys take one sample from the population, relationships are suggested, and findings can be 
generalized on the larger population (Gratton & Jones, 2010). In my research, I evaluated 
whether or not the participants were aware of the ticket scalping laws in New York State.  Then, 
I evaluated their perception of ticket scalping to see what sorts of relationships existed. 
Procedure 
The procedure for collecting my data involved sending out a survey (Appendix C) to 
faculty and staff members on campus.  I chose to target this group because the different levels of 
life experiences compared to the student body.  In order to select my participants, I gained access 
to the email list through the St. John Fisher department directory and then randomly select a 
number of them in order to generalize my results to the campus community.  In order to increase 
my response rate, I drafted a personal email to each participant(Appendix A), telling them the 
goal of my research and how their participation will assist me in understanding purchasing 
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behavior of tickets and the perception of the ticket scalping law.  I then sent out a similar letter a 
few days later containing the link to the survey (Appendix B). 
The first objective of my survey was to gauge awareness of the ticket scalping law and if 
people were informed buyers.  These questions are important because the state government and 
sport organizations view the ticket as a revocable license as well as a release of liability, which 
consumers are agreeing to when purchasing the ticket.   In order to figure out their awareness, I 
took portions of the law printed on the ticket and ask the participants if it’s “true,” “false” or “I 
don’t know.”  I also included some red herring questions to ensure the reliability of responses.  
The answers to these types of questions allowed me to separate the field of respondents who are 
aware or unaware of the law.    
The next step in my survey was to assess how the respondents feel about ticket scalping.  
Using likert scales on 1 to 5, with 1 representing strongly disagree and 5 representing strongly 
agree, I asked questions about the perception of the law.  For example, “Buyers and sellers are 
equally guilty in the transaction of a scalped ticket.” I also asked, “Scalpers are limited to people 
standing outside of the venue, not users on websites such as StubHub and Ebay.”  In addition to 
these questions, I collected information such as gender, age, education and income levels. 
Analysis 
After collecting this data, I used SPSS to conduct statistical tests to relate the data back to 
my research question.  Specifically, whether or not people are aware of the laws and if they have 
a positive or negative perception of ticket scalping.  I also wanted to see if the data could explain 
the sport deviance theory for spectators.  In order to do so, I ran nonparametric correlations for 
the ordinal variables and chi-square tests for nominal variables to see what sorts of relationships 
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exist.  This data allowed me to recommend an appropriate course of action for professional sport 
franchises and lawmakers. 
Results 
 Out of the 161 participants selected to take part in the study, 67 chose to answer the 
survey.  Four incomplete responses were removed from the data set and not used.  36 
respondents were women and 26 were men.  58 percent of the respondents earned $60,000 or 
more each year.  The median age range for the respondents was between 45 and 49 years old.  
The results were then uploaded into SPSS in order to run the necessary statistical tests to 
determine whether or not any relationships between the variables existed. 
Research Questions 
1) Are people living in New York State aware of the scalping laws? 
 In the survey, this awareness was tested by giving the participant three separate 
statements regarding scalping laws.  It must be noted that some participants answered correctly 
by guessing, instead of having knowledge on the laws.  The first statement was part of the actual 
law, which asked participants whether or not tickets could be resold above 45% of their face 
value.  Looking at table 1, 84.1% of the respondents were unaware of this portion of the law.  
With resale price being a major concern for sport organizations, this data explains the lack of 
knowledge consumers have, even though the law is printed on the back of each ticket. 
 The second portion of the law that was tested was the physical distance from the venue in 
order to legally sell tickets.  This question was a red-herring and participants were asked to 
indicate whether tickets sold within 100 feet of a box office was true or false.  Table 2 displays 
that a vast majority of the respondents were not versed in the law.  In fact, almost 15% of them 
answered incorrectly. 
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 Lastly, participants were asked whether the law only applied to physical transactions.  
This question also served as a red-herring, because laws pertain to physical and electronic 
transactions. For this portion of the law, three quarters of the respondents were unsure what types 
of transactions were covered.  Only a quarter answered correctly and were aware the scalping 
law pertained to both types.   




Table 2- Awareness of resale boundaries in New York State 
 
 
Table 3- Awareness of transaction liability in New York State 
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2) Why is purchasing tickets above face value still a problem? 
 
To answer this question, examining the purchase behavior of scalped tickets sheds light 
on why ticket transactions above face value still take place.  One relationship that exists is the 
willingness to pay above face value and whether the respondent has purchased from a scalper 
before.  Looking at table 4, while 14 out of the 63 responses indicated a willingness to pay above 
face value, only 6 people went so far as purchasing tickets from a scalper.  A chi-square 
significance test and non-parametric correlation was then used to observe the relationship. 
Using the statistical software, the relationship was tested.  The results indicated a 
statistically significant and moderately sized relationship between willingness to pay above face 
value and if the respondent has purchased tickets from a scalper, with Phi/Cramer’s V=.607, 
X2(2)=23.21, and p<.05. This data on purchase behavior sets up the next step, which is analyzing 
whether the respondents who paid above face value knowingly broke the law. 
Table 4- Crosstabulation for willingness to pay above face value and whether respondent 
purchased tickets from a scalper 
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Table 5- Chi-square test for willingness to pay above face value and whether respondent 
purchased tickets from a scalper 
 
Table 6- Correlations for willingness to pay above face value and whether respondent 
purchased tickets from a scalper 
 
As mentioned, the next step was to examine the resale law awareness and whether or not 
the respondent paid above face value for his/her ticket.  In order to establish a relationship 
between these behaviors, a non-parametric correlation was used.   
Looking at table 7, the lack of data prevented a relationship from being established 
between the two variables.  If there was more data, it would have helped to explain whether 
people intentionally break the law, and perhaps whether or not it is accepted as a common 
practice. While the results are miniscule, the data does show that out of the 6 respondents who 
purchased tickets, 4 of them unknowingly broke the law. 
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Table 7- Whether people in New York State knowingly break the law 
 
3) Should purchasers be held as liable as sellers? 
 
To answer this question, it would be best to examine the responses with whether or not 
the respondents were aware of the laws.  Essentially, when a transaction is made that violates one 
or all three of the scalping laws, both parties are guilty.  Sellers need to be conscious of where 
and how much he or she can resell a ticket, and buyers must also be informed of face value 
prices and proximity to the venue. 
To see what sort of relationships existed,a chi-square test was conducted.  The chi-square 
test indicated that there was no statistical significance between purchaser-seller liability and 
resale limit and transaction liability.  However, there was a significant relationship between 
resale proximity awareness and purchaser-seller liability.  In order to increase the accuracy, the 
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5-level variable was recoded into a 3-level variable and the test was re-run, yielding usable 
results. 
Tables 8 and 9 show the crosstabulation and chi-square significance testing.  The results 
of the test showed a statistically significant relationship between awareness of resale proximity 
awareness and purchaser-seller liability, with  X2(4)=7.92, and p<.1.  Had the awareness of the 
laws been greater for all three questions, more concrete relationships with purchaser-seller 
liability could have been established. 
Table 8- Crosstabulation for resale proximity awareness and purchaser-seller liability 
 
Table 9- Chi-square test for resale proximity awareness and purchaser-seller liability 
 
TICKET SCALPING IN NEW YORK STATE 27 
Discussion 
 The results of this study supported previous research that people are unaware that a 
scalping law exists, even though it is printed on the back of most event tickets.  However, it 
failed to support the claim that people knowingly break the law.  The majority of the respondents 
were unable to correctly answer questions regarding resale price and proximity to the venue.  It 
is worth noting that roughly 84 percent of the respondents typically chose to purchase their 
tickets through the primary market, avoiding secondary websites and more importantly, scalpers. 
 Respondents to the survey did have a direct correlation between a willingness to pay 
more for event tickets and purchasing from a scalper.  Additionally, there was a correlation 
between awareness of resale proximity to the venue and ultimately who should be held liable for 
transactions involving scalped tickets.  Yet, the data was not able to explain the sport deviance 
theory in previous studies on scalping behavior (Atkinson, 2000).   
 Another interesting finding in the research was that nearly two-thirds of the respondents 
believed event producers, law enforcement personnel, and secondary resale sites should work 
together to enforce scalping policies.  However, prior research indicates these parties do little 
because a lack of enforcement by lawmakers, and the volume of money changing hands (Drayer, 
2011a).  This problem may not be addressed unless some sort of federal legislation is passed, or 
scalping laws are eliminated altogether (Drayer, 2011a).   
 While the research presented data on scalping behavior, there were some limitations in 
the study.  The first limitation was that we were unable to prove whether or not the law was 
intentionally broken when purchasing scalped tickets.  This leads into the next limitation of the 
study that there was a lack of diversity when it came to purchasing behavior (only 6 people had 
ever purchased tickets from a scalper before).  The research would have been more effective if 
the sample consisted of sport fans that regularly purchase tickets.   
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 Based on the current findings and the aforementioned limitations, future research should 
focus on the awareness of the law and whether it is intentionally broken when buying or selling 
tickets above face value.  Another recommendation for the future would be changing the setting 
of the research to sport fans that regularly make ticket purchases.  This would lend more 
information to purchasing behaviors and the channel used when buying tickets.  By making these 
changes, the data would be more concrete, making it valuable to professional organizations and 
lawmakers.  
 
TICKET SCALPING IN NEW YORK STATE 29 
References 
Atkinson, M. (2000). Brother, can you spare a seat? Developing recipes of knowledge in the 
ticket scalping subculture. Sociology of Sport Journal, 17(2), 151-170.  
Benitah, J. C. (2005). Anti-scalping laws: Should they be forgotten? Texas Review of 
Entertainment & Sports Law, 6(1), 55-78.  
Busch, L., & Curry, P. A. (2011). Ticket pricing and the impression of excess demand. 
Economics Letters, 111(1), 40-42. 
Carmon, Z., & Ariely, D. (2000). Focusing on the forgone: How value can appear so different to 
buyers and sellers. Journal of Consumer Research, 27, 360-370. 
Cavoto v. Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc., 222 Ill.2d 569 (2006). 
Courty, P. (2003). Some economics of ticket resale. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
17(2), 85-97. 
Depken, C. A. (2007). Another look at anti-scalping laws: Theory and evidence. Public Choice, 
130(1-2), 55-77. 
Drayer, J. (2011a). Examining the effectiveness of anti-scalping laws in a United States market. 
Sport Management Review, 14(3), 226-236. 
Drayer, J. (2011b). Making a case for the integration of the primary and secondary ticket markets 
for professional team sports in the United States. International Journal of Sports 
Marketing & Sponsorship, 12(3), 199-208. 
Drayer, J., Rascher, D.A., & McEvoy, C.D. (2012). An examination of underlying consumer 
demand and sport pricing using secondary market data. Sport Management Review, 
15(4), 448-460.  
TICKET SCALPING IN NEW YORK STATE 30 
Drayer, J., & Shapiro, S. L. (2009). Value determination in the secondary ticket market: A 
quantitative analysis of the NFL playoffs. Sport Marketing Quarterly, 18(1), 5-13. 
 
Drayer, J., Stotlar, K. D., & Irwin, L. R. (2008). Tradition vs. trend: A case study of team 
response to the secondary ticket market. Sport Marketing Quarterly, 17(4), 235-240. 
Geng, X., Wu, R., & Whinston, A. B. (2007). Profiting from partial allowance of ticket resale. 
Journal of Marketing, 71(2), 184-195. 
Glantz, D. (2005). For-Bid scalping online?: Anti-scalping legislation in an internet society. 
Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal, 23(1), 261-305.  
Gratton, C. & Jones, I. (2010). Research methods for sport studies (2nd ed.). London: Routledge 
Publishers 
Happel, S. K., & Jennings, M. M. (2002). Creating a futures market for major event tickets: 
Problems and prospects. Cato Journal, 21(3), 443-461. 
Harrington, D. E. (2009). Lessons from a scalper. Regulation, 32(1), 16-20.  
Harrington, D. E. (2010). Uncapping ticket markets. Regulation, 33(3), 6-12. 
 
Harrington, D. E., & Harrington, E. K. (2012). Scalping scalpers—or consumers? Regulation, 
35(3), 10-25. 
Howard, D., & Burton, R. (2002). Sports marketing in a recession: It’s a brand new game. 
International Journal of Sports Marketing and Sponsorship, 4(1). 
Howard, D., & Crompton, J. (2004). Tactics used by sports organizations in the United States to 
increase ticket sales. Managing Leisure, 9(2), 87-95. 
Karp, L., & Perloff, J.M. (2005). When promoters like scalpers. Journal of Economics & 
Management Strategy, 14(2), 477-508. 
TICKET SCALPING IN NEW YORK STATE 31 
Kirkman, C. P. (2009). Who needs tickets? Examining problems in the growing online ticket 
resale industry. Federal Communications Law Journal, 61(3), 739-763. 
Klein, Z. H. (2010). Who’s the boss? The need for regulation of the ticketing industry. Brooklyn 
Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law, 5(1), 185-214. 
Kobritz, J., & Palmer, S. (2011). Dynamic pricing: The next frontier in the evolution of ticket 
pricing in sports. Review of Management Innovation and Creativity, 4(9), 118-130. 
Moore, D. (2010). The times they are a changing: Secondary ticket market moves from taboo to 
mainstream. Texas Review of Entertainment & Sports Law, 11(2), 295-307.  
Nagel, M. S. (2011). Changing attitudes regarding ticket "rights". Journal of Venue & Event 
Management, 3(2), 33. 
People v. Concert Connection Ltd. 211 A.D.2d 310, 629 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1995). 
People v. Lewis 50 A.D.3d 595, 857 N.Y.S.2d 88 (2008). 
Rishe, P. J., & Mondello, M. J. (2004). Ticket price determination in professional sports: An 
empirical analysis of the NBA, NFL, NHL, and Major League Baseball. Sport Marketing 
Quarterly, 13(2), 104-112. 
Schroeder, E., Fisher, J., Orbe, J., & Bush, J. (2012). A brief overview on ticket scalping laws, 
secondary ticket markets, and the StubHub effect. Entertainment & Sports Lawyer, 30(2), 
1-32.  
Simon, S. D. (2004). If you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em: implications for New York’s scalping law 
in light of recent developments in the ticket business. Fordham Law Review, 72(4), 1171-
1218. 
TICKET SCALPING IN NEW YORK STATE 32 
Siporin, M. (2004). Cavato v. Chicago nat'l league ball club, inc.: Chicago Cubs ticket scalping 
scandal and the relationship between separate corporate entities owned by a common 
parent. DePaul Business & Commercial Law Journal, 2(4), 723-759. 
Spindler, Z. (2003). How “parasites” serve their host: A graphical analysis of “scalping.” Public 
Finance Review, 31(6), 694-699. 
Swofford, J. L. (2003). A graphical analysis of "scalping": A reply. Public Finance Review, 
31(6), 700-704. 
 
TICKET SCALPING IN NEW YORK STATE 33 
Appendix A 
Pre-notice Letter to Participants 
 
Dear               , 
 
My name is Kevin Lute and I am currently working towards a Sport Management degree here at 
St. John Fisher.  The sport and entertainment industry continues to grow, with ticket prices 
reaching an all-time high.  Additionally, consumers are no longer limited to buying tickets from 
the box office.  That being said, I’m interested in ticket purchasing process and how people 
perceive scalping. 
 
In a few days you will receive another email requesting your participation in a brief survey.  The 
goal is to better understand how people perceive ticket scalping in New York State.  A link to the 
survey will be provided in the next email.  Your responses will be kept confidential. 
 
I hope you will consider participating in this study.  If you have any questions, please feel free to 
contact me at kml05306@sjfc.edu or my advisor, Katharine Burakowski at 
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Appendix B 
Request Letter to Participants 
 
Dear              : 
 
A few days ago you were sent an email informing you of a study I am conducting here at St. 
John Fisher.  The purpose is to better understanding ticket purchasing habits and the perception 
of scalping here in New York.   
 
As a participant in this study you will be asked to complete a survey, which can be found by 
clicking the following link.  The survey will take approximately 5-7 minutes to complete. 
 
Participation in this study is voluntary.  You may decide not to participate or withdraw at any 
time, without consequence.  If you have any questions, feel free to contact me at 
kml05306@sjfc.edu or my advisor, Katharine Burakowski at kburakowski@sjfc.edu.  
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Appendix C 
Survey to Participants 
Perception of Ticket Scalping in New York State 
 
Q24 ${m://FirstName},   My name is Kevin Lute, and I am currently working towards a Sport 
Management degree here at St. John Fisher.  The sport and entertainment industry continues to 
grow, with ticket prices reaching an all-time high.  Additionally, consumers are no longer limited 
to buying tickets from the box office.  That being said, I’m currently interested in understanding 
the perception of ticket scalping in New York State.   The information you provide may assist 
sport and entertainment promoters, as well as local governments in their ticket resale policies. 
 The risk associated with this survey is that some of the questions deal with ticket scalping, 
which to a certain extent is illegal in New York State.   However, responses to this survey will be 
kept confidential and results will be presented in a comprehensive form.     Participation in this 
study is voluntary.  You may decide not to participate in this study or you may choose to cease 
participation at any time, without consequence.  The survey will take approximately 5-10 
minutes.  If you have any questions, feel free to contact me at kml05306@sjfc.edu or my 
advisor, Dr. Katharine Burakowski at kburakowski@sjfc.edu.    By completing this survey, you 
give me permission for your participation.  Please indicate your agreement to voluntarily 
participate in this survey. 
I agree to voluntarily participate (1) 
I decline to participate (2) 
 
Q26 Please answer the following question about where you typically purchase your tickets.  
 
Q1 When going to an event, where do you typically acquire your tickets? 
Primary Source (ex: Event Box Office or Event Website) (1) 
Secondary Source (ex: Website such as StubHub/Ebay or Scalper) (2) 
 
Q27 Please indicate the level to which the following factors are important to you when 
purchasing tickets from a primary source. 
 
Q2 When acquiring tickets from a primary source, what is important to you? 










(1)      
Price (2)      
Customer 
Service (3)      
Convenience 
(4)      
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Q28 Please indicate the level to which the following factors are important to you when 
purchasing tickets from a secondary source. 
 
Q3 When acquiring tickets from a secondary source, what is important to you? 










(1)      
Price (2)      
Customer 
Service (3)      
Convenience 
(4)      
 
Q30 Please answer the following questions about your ticket purchasing behavior. 
 
Q13 In what time frame do you typically purchase tickets for an event? 
More than 2-3 days before an event (1) 
2-3 days before an event (2) 
Day before the event (3) 
Day of the event (4) 
 




I don't know (3) 
 
Q5 If I cannot get the tickets I want from a primary source , I'm willing to pay more than the 
printed price for a ticket. 
Agree (1) 
Disagree (2) 
I don't know (3) 
 




Q24 With reference to the previous question, please answer the following questions about your 
experience with a ticket scalper. 
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Q20 What type of an event did you attend? 
Sporting event (1) 
Concert (2) 
Theatrical production (3) 
Other (4) 
 
Q11 Were you originally planning on purchasing your tickets from the event box office before 




















Q25 The following statements are designed to gauge your awareness of New York State&#39;s 
ticket scalping law.  Please answer to the best of your ability. 
 
Q14 In New York State, tickets may be resold above 45% of their face value.  For example, a 
$100 ticket may be resold for a maximum of $145. 
True (1) 
False (2) 
I don't know (3) 
 
Q15 In New York State, people are allowed to resell tickets as long as he/she is 100 feet away 
from the box office. 
True (1) 
False (2) 
I don't know (3) 
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Q16 In New York State, ticket scalping laws only apply to physical transactions between people. 
True (1) 
False (2) 
I don't know (3) 
 
Q18 Please review the statements below and indicate the level to which you agree/disagree. 
 Level You Agree/Disagree 




















value may be 
breaking the 
law, but have 
existed for 
years and 
should not be 
bothered. (2) 









outside of a 
venue. (3) 




be held as 
liable as the 
sellers. (4) 
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Q19 Who should responsible for enforcing scalping policies? 
Event producer (1) 
Law enforcement personnel (2) 
Secondary ticket sellers (3) 
All of the above (4) 
 
Q29 Please answer the following questions about yourself. 
 




Q25 Please indicate your age. 









65 or older (10) 
 
Q27 Please indicate your yearly income. 
$23,999 or less (1) 
$24,000 to $29,999 (2) 
$30,000 to $34,999 (3) 
$35,000 to $39,999 (4) 
$40,000 to $44,999 (5) 
$45,000 to $49,999 (6) 
$50,000 to $54,999 (7) 
$55,000 to $59,999 (8) 
$60,000 or more (9) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
